The following dissertation was written by Sussex University student Ben King,
as part of his Cultural and Intellectual History degree. It is based
upon over 400 declassified documents as well as the limited
historiography surrounding the subject.
nb. The link at the bottom of this article will take you to a list of references, which are themselves linked to original documents where possible.
nb. The link at the bottom of this article will take you to a list of references, which are themselves linked to original documents where possible.
Introduction
The scale of the Holocaust showed the world just how horrific state
sponsored crimes against humanity could become if left unchecked.
Following Hitler’s downfall, the victorious allies helped create the
United Nations, a multinational governing body whose focus was to ensure
that the world would never repeat the mistakes and catastrophes of the
previous half-century. They introduced a raft of new international
humanitarian laws and ideals such as the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights which laid the framework for future international laws and state
conduct, marking a significant step in the progression of theories of
human rights. With the establishment of the U.N, the international
community had created the judicial structure needed to enshrine this new
humanitarian declaration as a guiding principle for the world to
uphold. After such discriminative inhumanity, the explicit recognition
of basic freedom and rights to all of mankind was a significant
milestone, possibly even vindicating Hegel’s idea of man’s teleological
journey toward self-realisation. At the time of the infamous Nuremberg
Trials, Robert H. Jackson, America’s Chief Prosecutor, said in his
opening statement that, “We must never forget that the record on which
we judge these defendants today is the record on which history will
judge us tomorrow.”1 With this statement in mind, I intend to focus on
the case-study of Indonesia’s invasion of West Papua in 1962 and the
subsequent ‘elections’ which saw them gain official sovereignty of the
country in 1969. After leading the way with the introduction of equal
rights for all mankind, have the western states kept to their word?
Geographical and Historical Background
The archipelago of Indonesia, consisting of over 2000 islands, spans
15% of the world’s landmass2. A Dutch colony from 1828 to 1961, West
Papua (formally known as Irian Jaya) is located on the western half of
the large island of New Guinea, 400 miles off the Northern Australian
coast. Despite having just 0.1% of the world’s population, the
primitive, tribal groups that live within its rainforest harbour some
15% of the worlds known languages3. The people of New Guinea are
predominantly Christian (through missionaries dispatched to the Island
after the tribes were discovered) and are Melanesian in race, compared
to Indonesia which is mainly Muslim Javanese.
Indonesia carried out military operations in West Papua through
1961/62 after the UN had refused to recognise their territorial claims.4
This resulted in the signing of the U.S brokered New York Agreement5, a
roadmap for the transition of power from the Dutch which required
Indonesia to hold free elections (the Act of Free Choice as it was to
become known) so as to uphold the West Papuans right to
self-determination. This right is enshrined in International Law
established by the UN, an organisation to which Indonesia, the
Netherlands and the US were member states. Since the ‘Act of Free
Choice’ (AFC) in 1969, West Papua has been widely recognised by the vast
majority of world states legally to be a province of Indonesia. West
Papuan representatives voted to become incorporated into the newly
independent and emerging power of South-East Asia. The UN oversaw and
ratified the election, providing legitimacy that was recently endorsed
in a letter sent to Robert Wilson MP by Meg Munn MP, UK Foreign Office
with responsibility for the UK’s relations with Indonesia.
The Act of Free Choice took place in Papua in 1969. A group of 1,000
Papuan representatives, who were given the responsibility to make the
choice on behalf of the Papuan people, voted to remain part of
Indonesia. The British Government of the day supported the Act of Free
Choice, as did the United Nations and almost all members of the
international community.6
Current Historiography
This is the reigning official view presented to anyone who enquires
about West Papua to the UK government7. The current literature dealing
with this subject is somewhat sparse; at least within the mainstream
press. There have been numerous Non-Governmental Organisations such as
Minority Rights International and Amnesty who have compiled reports on
the situation in West Papua, but it seems that East Timor’s conflict
with Indonesia in 1975 and the realization of independence in 1999 has
overshadowed West Papua’s case. British Historian John Saltford has
written on the Act of Free Choice8, and others, such as Dr Kees
Lagerberg, have highlighted aspects of Indonesian Imperialism and human
rights abuses. West Papuan authors are ‘censored under certain criteria
set by the government or are banned entirely’ 9. The main reason, I
think, that has contributed to the lack of literature regarding West
Papua is the fact that since the AFC, West Papua has been regarded as an
internal matter for Indonesia and as such has not received nearly the
amount of attention as the invasion and occupation of East Timor (which
never received UN support or ratification). Many of those writing on
this subject do so to highlight the plight of the West Papuan people. Dr
John Saltford is one of the only people I could find to have written a
book documenting the role of Britain and the United Nations in the AFC,
though this represents a focus on the time of the AFC only. West Papua
and Indonesia Since Suharto by Peter King and Reluctant Indonesians by
Clinton Fernandez represent the sum total of English language books
released on the subject in the last decade yet even those do not cover
what it is I wish to explore: how the International Community attempted
to fulfil their human rights obligations as member states of the UN.
I intend to examine the historical account of the AFC to see whether
and how the international community complied with UN resolution 1514
(XV): Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries
and Peoples10 Using declassified communications between the U.S embassy
in Djakarta and the State Department 1968-69, I will trace the story of
the U.N supervisor for the AFC, Fernando Ortiz-Sanz, to show how these
elections were rigged in Indonesia’s favour, despite the known
possibility of repression and persecution.
Having established the illegitimacy of the AFC and Indonesia’s
annexation of West Papua, I will go on to show that since the handover
of power in 1969 there have been widespread occurrences of human rights
abuses as a matter of government policy. In assessing Kees Lagerberg’s
claim that ‘between 100’000 and 200’000 West Papuans have died or simply
vanished at the hands of the Indonesian military”11, this section
contextualizes the International Communities’ response in the years
after the AFC. The lack of English language historiography regarding
this matter requires I use NGO reports and investigative journalist
materials in my research.
1969 and the Act of Free Choice is highly significant given that it’s
illegitimacy makes all future repression an International crime with
the international support for Indonesia’s illegal actions directly
undermining the UN charter and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. I intend to evaluate to what extent they complied with
Ortiz-Sanz’ warning that “the international community cannot renounce
its responsibility for assisting them (Irianese) in years to come”12.
Member nations of the U.N have a clear obligation under the UN Charter
to uphold the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to which “everyone
is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth… without
distinction of any kind”.13 From over 200 pages of recently declassified
documents stretching over 30 years from British, U.S and other
governments it is possible to analyse in depth the geo-political,
commercial and ideological forces at play in the highest levels of
office for the continuing support for Indonesia actions. The result is
an insight rarely seen into how it was possible that such violations of
international law could be perpetrated, apparently without recourse,
despite having the framework in place designed to avoid such situations.
The Act of “Free” Choice, West Papua, 1969.
Under the Dutch plan for self-determination in 1961, West Papuans
completed a ‘territory wide vote for representatives to the newly
established New Guinea Council… which ratified the adoption of the
national Papuan Morning Star flag, the national anthem and a new name
for the territory: West Papua14’. When the UN refused to support
Indonesia’s territorial claims, the Government of Indonesia (GOI)
invaded West Papua leading to the establishment of the New York
Agreement in 196215. When the New York Agreement was signed, it was
stipulated that free elections were to be held (again) to establish the
West Papuan people’s right to self-determination. This had to be done in
order to bring the transition into line with the 1960 UN Resolution
1514 (XV). The UN says that, “while the Charter of the United Nations
treated self-determination as a principle, rather than a right, the
Declaration marked a turning point by stating that “all peoples have the
right to self-determination”16. Its first article states that ‘The
subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation
constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights’17. Bolivian Fernando
Ortiz-Sanz was sent to Indonesia to oversee the preparations for and the
implementation of the AFC, a subject of numerous in-depth
communications between the U.S embassy in Djakarta and the Secretary of
State from July 1968 until the AFC took place in September 1969.
It was clear to Ortiz-Sanz from the very beginning that the
forthcoming elections would not satisfy international law, namely
Resolution 1514 (XV). As early as the summer of 1968, the U.S embassy
was warning that “he [Ortiz-Sanz] will resign rather than preside over a
farce”18. What concerned Ortiz-Sanz was that Indonesia had no interest
in holding a free election and that since the New York Agreement left
Indonesia responsible for its implementation, it rendered his role
“useless”19. In August, having recognized that if such views became
public it would “be most embarrassing”, the U.S resolved to do “anything
we can to make him aware of the political realities”20. Following
conversations with Ortiz-Sanz, the US mission of the UN in New York
informed Washington that they were “convinced Ortiz [is] fully aware of
[the] difficult situation in which GOI finds itself and has no intention
of making [a] difficult situation worse”21. The ‘difficult situation’
which faced GOI was the risk of domestic upheaval should West Papua be
lost to Indonesia; there was a ‘widespread belief in the military and
other circles… that West Irian is [already] a sovereign part of
Indonesia’22.
Having been made aware of the ‘political realities’ involved,
Ortiz-Sanz strove to win the best possible deal for the West Papuan
people as he could. He was “deeply moved by his contacts with the
primitive Irianese”23 and tried to urge the GOI to accept a ‘one man-one
vote’ system in coastal cities24. Despite his efforts, Ortiz-Sanz
clearly felt the AFC to be below the required standards laid out in
Resolution 1514 (XV), telling the First Secretary Robert Slutz that he
‘would make no conclusions regarding the elections in his report and
that each member state of the UN would have to decide for itself whether
the act were acceptable under the NY Agreement’25. “On the positive
side…” wrote Djakarta Embassy to Washington regarding this meeting,
“…the ambassador concluded that there is little doubt that the Act will
be decided in favour of West Irian’s continued inclusion in the
Indonesian Republic”26.
How could it be that in May of 1969, months before the election took place, the result could be in ‘little doubt’? Ortiz-Sanz makes clear after the election that ‘despite his efforts, art XXII of NY Agreement relating to Freedom of speech, Freedom of movement and assembly “was not fully implemented and the administration exercised at all times a tight political control over the population.”27
It was known well in advance to the UK, US and Australian governments
that only one outcome of the AFC would be deemed acceptable by both
Indonesia and the western powers. The British Embassy in Djakarta,
commenting on Ortiz-Sanz role when he entered the country in December
1968, said, “Tactically his aim is to contrive a formula whereby the AFC
will result in a positive affirmation of Indonesia’s sovereignty but
will also represent a fair reflection of the peoples wishes… clearly no
easy task”28. The following month they clarified this comment, stating
that ‘most independent observers are convinced that, given a free
choice, the majority of the local inhabitants would not vote for
continued incorporation in Indonesia.”29. This fact was widely known to
all parties at the time, with one journalist telling the British embassy
that of all the people he met (300-400) none were in favour of
integration. Indeed, he said that he felt ‘the Papuans loath the
Indonesians, perhaps in the same degree and as a direct consequence of
the way which Indonesians have despised and belittled the Papuans’30.
The U.S embassy in Djakarta summed up the situation rather beautifully
in a telegram dated September 1969, just before the ‘vote’ took place,
which said, “the Act of Free Choice in West Irian is unfolding like a
Greek Tragedy, the conclusion pre-ordained… it long known that the
outcome of AFC is predictable… separation is unthinkable”31. This was
clearly not the wish of ‘99% of the Papuan population32’ and directly
contravenes article two of Resolution 1514 (XV): All peoples have the
right to self-determination33.
As early as October 1967 the U.S already knew that there was little
hope for a fair election. ‘The reality is grim…’ reads an air-gram to
the Department of State, ‘Now there is no freedom of speech, no freedom
of movement, and forceful oppression is the rule’34. In the end, the GOI
hand-picked 1025 representatives: these included bribed tribal chiefs
and family members and friends of Indonesian administration officials35
which, together with the ‘great efforts of indoctrination… [and] Indon
(sic) repression caused by fear of separatism’36, combined to create a
unanimous vote for continued inclusion in Indonesia37.
Had the U.S, U.K and others thought that the result of this election
would lead to development, economic growth and a better life for the
people of West Papua, one could possibly understand the reason why
international law was ignored when the UN ratified Indonesia’s
sovereignty. However, in reality this was not the case, as this air-gram
to the Secretary of State in August 1969 shows:
It is difficult to predict whether the GOI will (be prepared to) take
harsh repressive measures or seek to establish good government and
further economic progress in the region. The outcome is likely to be
mixed or uneven38.
Interestingly, the ‘be prepared to’ was crossed out on the document
but is still discernable underneath39. It goes on to say that
‘Overraction (sic) and brutal repression would have an undesirable
effect on International opinion but, then, the Indonesians have been
known to ignore these consequences in quashing other revolts in the
past’. As a member state of the UN, it seems a shame that the focus of
this ‘undesirable effect’ is not on the West Papuan people themselves,
rather than world opinion.
The justification given for supporting this rigged election appears
two fold. One is that the U.S was ‘determined not to lose Indonesia to
Communist influence’40, either through a coup or increased Soviet
influence. The other often quoted reason was that a democratic election
was impossible due to the nature of the ‘stone-age, illiterate tribal
groups whose horizons are strictly limited and who would be unable to
grasp alternatives involved in free plebiscite…free election among
groups such as this would be much more of a farce than any rigged
mechanism Indonesia could devise41’. Despite independent observers
noting the understanding of overwhelming numbers of people with regard
to their wanting Independence, article 3 of Resolution 1514 (XV) was
ignored: ‘Inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational
preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying
independence’42.
Post Act of Free Choice: Attempted genocide?
Other than a few NGO reports and papers written by (mainly Australian
or Dutch) academics, there has been precious little written about the
situation in West Papua. The genocide committed by the GOI in East Timor
received more attention though even that has not served as a catalyst
for a re-visitation of the AFC. A few academics, NGO’s and investigative
journalists have attempted to raise the issue of Indonesian policy
towards the inhabitants of West Papua, finding enough evidence to
produce the occasional book, report or documentary. Although the current
UK stance is that ‘human rights abuses are hard to verify due to the
remoteness of the area’43, this does not seem to have stopped others
from finding evidence of such crimes (though it has taken a long time
for people to take notice with much of the material being published only
in the last 15 years.)
Dr Kees Lagerberg, author of West Irian and Jakarta Imperialism, is
one of the few western academics to have written on this topic. He
served the Dutch colonial administration for 11 years and travelled back
to West Papua to document the post-ACF situation in West Papua. He
claims that ‘it is impossible to explain away the disappearance of
150’000 Papuans without highlighting the considerable measure of neglect
shown by the Indonesian authorities towards the Papuans44′ He uses
population and migration statistics to conclude these statistics
although he does not appear to have considered the possibility of
inaccurate census data. Over the following chapter, I will contextualize
the international communities’ response by highlighting occurrences
which could help account for Lagerberg’s claim.
Even before the AFC, it was clear the extent to which Indonesia was prepared to use force against a largely unarmed population: Indonesia’s military command had already shown their capacity to commit mass murder. Following Suharto’s accession to power in 1965, over 500’000 known or suspected communists were killed in one of the most bloody episodes in human history45. This was even celebrated in the U.S, where it formed another front-line in the ongoing fight against the spread of communism46. This letter from the British embassy, dated April 1968, highlights the UK government’s knowledge of Indonesian tactics: “The Indonesians have tried everything from bombing them with B.26′s [sic]. to shelling and mortaring them, but a continuous state of semi-rebellion persists. Brutalities are undoubtedly perpetrated from time to time in a fruitless attempt at repression”47.
Having made its decision on the legality of the AFC, the UN had
ensured that the matter remained an internal dispute, closing off any
chance of justice for the West Papuan people through the correct, legal
channels of the General Assembly. As an internal matter for the GOI to
resolve, the plight of West Papua was no longer a matter for discussion
within the International Community and the Media. The Hon. F.H.
Faleomavaega called the U.N ratification “a truly pathetic episode”48;
unfortunately what was to follow turned a pathetic episode into the
pre-curser for 40 years of repression and possible genocide.
‘Genocide in West Papua’ is the title of a 2005 report written by
John Wing of Sydney University. He holds no punches in his assessment of
Indonesia’s efforts to control the local guerrilla movement called the
OPM. Here is an excerpt from that report:
the current situation is referred to as a “silent genocide”. Villages
are destroyed by TNI (Indonesian forces) through arson, following
“incidents” blamed on the OPM guerrilla movement, but the incidents
themselves are staged and guerrillas (if any) are manipulated by the
TNI. Civilians are then forced to take refuge in areas away from their
food gardens, where they perish from malnutrition and exposure49.
Abigail Abrash from the Harvard Law School Human Rights Program has
also written a paper entitled ‘Papua: Another East Timor?50’. She
highlights examples of racial and religious discrimination, including
‘extrajudicial killings, torture and rape… that amounted to an
undeclared war against the indigenous population51. What both reports
have in common is there insistence that genocide is, whether as a matter
of policy or not, at least a very real possibility for the people of
West Papua.
Non-governmental organizations work hard at providing objective and
accurate accounts of human rights abuses all over the world. One such
report by Minority Rights Group International highlights the effects of
Indonesia’s transmigration policy in West Papua which, as well as
dominating West Papua’s economy, ‘will also make the indigenous peoples a
minority within their own country’52 Amnesty International, in their
latest statement regarding West Papua, conclude that ‘there were reports
of extrajudicial executions, torture and ill-treatment, excessive use
of force during demonstrations and harassment of human rights
defenders’53. Others include Tapol, meaning political prisoner in
Indonesian, a website ‘promoting human rights, peace and democracy in
Indonesia’ who publish regular articles and reports relating to ongoing
human rights issues. More partisan websites like FreeWestPapua.org also
work hard in bringing together the latest news and reports from various
independent sources. Together with unverifiable, though extensive and
detailed, reports of human rights abuses, they also collate media
reports, political developments and NGO and UN visits.
Australian investigative journalist Evan Williams travelled to West
Papua in 2006 for a Channel Four documentary entitled ‘Rainforest
Warriors’54. Under heavy observation from Indonesian officials, Williams
travelled deep into the jungle to meet with guerrilla soldiers
including many students who have fled urban areas following protests
which left them vulnerable to arrest or “disappearance”55. They tell the
film crew of their grievances with the Indonesians, such as the threat
of 15 years imprisonment for raising the ‘Morning Star’ flag of West
Papua, the immense environmental damage and exploitation of natural
resources by US mining company Freeport McMoran and the fact that the
local West Papuans see no benefits from the enormous profits being
generated there. More worryingly still, Evan Williams visits medical
clinics which, although short of almost every type of medicine and drug,
seem to have ample supplies of contraceptive injections which, the
medical staff there tell Williams, they are advised to give to
Melanesian women without their consent or knowledge.
Any way you look at the situation, it is clear that the indigenous
people of West Papua have not benefitted from Indonesian rule. As for
the Universal Declaration for Human Rights, it would be considerably
easier to refer to those clauses that have been applied than to those
that have been ignored56. Yet because this is now regarded as an
internal matter for Indonesia there has not been a single Security
Council resolution asking for a cessation of repressive measures
undertaken by this member state. Now that it is clear that the AFC was
neither representative of nor beneficial to the people of West Papua, I
wish to look at what the response of the International community was in
upholding their obligations of universal human rights and how this
response contributed to the contemporary historical development of the
region.
The International Communities Response
Diplomatic and Strategic support for Indonesia post-AFC
It is very clear from U.S and U.K government documents from 1968/69 that there was an almost universal feeling of ‘understanding’ for Indonesia’s situation and indifference to the problems faced by the West Papuans57. I.J.M Sutherland, writing to London from the British embassy in Djakarta, summed up this feeling when he said, “I cannot imagine the US, Japanese, Dutch or Australian Governments putting at risk their economic and political relations with Indonesia on a matter of principle involving a relatively small number of very primitive people.”58
It is very clear from U.S and U.K government documents from 1968/69 that there was an almost universal feeling of ‘understanding’ for Indonesia’s situation and indifference to the problems faced by the West Papuans57. I.J.M Sutherland, writing to London from the British embassy in Djakarta, summed up this feeling when he said, “I cannot imagine the US, Japanese, Dutch or Australian Governments putting at risk their economic and political relations with Indonesia on a matter of principle involving a relatively small number of very primitive people.”58
Even the former colonial rulers of West Papua and their nearest
neighbour provided no official objections, as this quote from a US State
Department telegram from 1969 shows: “Dutch government, despite its
historic interest and Australia as neighbour appear disinclined to
become involved and have indicated their acquiescence in GOI method and
result of AFC”59. It seems that individually, western states did not
feel compelled to adhere to International Law and chose instead to
foster good economic and political relations with Indonesia.
What about the United Nations itself? Having ratified the AFC, did
they not, in the words of Ortiz-Sanz, have an obligation not to
‘renounce its responsibility for helping them in years to come’? It is
clear that, in this situation, the will of individual states triumphed
over the principles of the United Nations Charter, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and Resolution 1514 (XV). The British
government recognizes this when it concluded in November 1969 that the
AFC had led “[Impartial Observers to] feel that the United Nations part
has done nothing to enhance its standing”60 Since that time there has
not been a single General Assembly or Security Council resolution
regarding Indonesia’s actions in West Papua.
Whilst some countries, such as Australia and the Netherlands, chose
to merely acquiesce to Indonesia, others chose to actively support them.
The U.S government, in their ideological struggle against the spread of
communism, saw Indonesia in the 1960’s as an important ally in a region
where the U.S was fighting in Vietnam and Indochina61. Since 1965, the
U.S and President Suharto have been close allies, with Suharto having
met with successive US Presidents until his forced resignation in 1998.
Every meeting was recorded and the minutes have since been released on
the National Security Archive. These minutes provide an illuminating
account of the ‘excellent relations’ between the two nations in a joint
struggle against the spread of communism; a threat that Suharto
emphasizes time and again in an attempt to secure arms deals62 (a topic I
shall come back to shortly).
In the year following the AFC, Suharto came to Washington where,
having been briefed by Henry Kissinger, President Nixon pledged
$15million of military aid, including C-47’s transports ‘which can be
turned into ‘gun-ship’ versions’63. In the minutes for that very
meeting, commenting on Nixon’s questions regarding the communist threat,
Suharto claims outright that ‘strategically their strength can be said
to have been nullified… tens of thousand have been interrogated and
placed in detention…[as for the students] they have received
indoctrination concerning the ideas of the New Order’64. The bluntness
of Suharto’s claims was almost a match for the hypocrisy shown in
Nixon’s concluding remarks to Suharto. Barely six months since West
Papua’s forced capitulation to Indonesian sovereignty, Nixon spoken of
Vietnam that:
Our interest is solely to help create those conditions which permit
these countries to freely choose their own way, not determined by any
outside influence. This is a fundamental principle. We would like to
cooperate with all nations which share this fundamental principle65
President Nixon to President Suharto, 1970
Genocide in East Timor
Despite extensive knowledge of Indonesia’s violation of Human Rights
both in West Papua and Indonesia itself, even the invasion of East Timor
on December 6th, 1975 failed to cajole any major western state to
officially condemn Indonesia’s actions. After a civil war which left the
leftist, nationalist Fretilin party in control, there was a general
acquiescence to Indonesia’s takeover before it had commenced. As early
as March 1975, it was clear to the British Foreign and Commonwealth
office that “East Timor’s eventual integration with Indonesia is
probably the right answer.”66 It was given the green light by the US who
actually asked for the invasion to be delayed by one day so as not to
coincide with the visit of President Ford and Henry Kissinger67.
Nor did Australia seem prepared to publicly condemn Indonesia.
Despite receiving instruction to ‘deliver a clear message to the
Indonesians that Australia could not countenance Indonesian interference
in the affairs of Timor”, Australian Ambassador Woolcott described how
he had persuaded Canberra to modify these instructions and of how he
spoke as “softly” as his new instructions permitted to Indonesian
foreign minister Malik on October 18th 197568. This suggests that
Australian Officials had decided as a matter of policy not to oppose
Indonesia’s pending invasion.
After Indonesian troops killed five British and Australian
journalists in 1975, the UK government lied about having information on
the event and refused to even raise the matter with Indonesia,
suggesting to Australia that ‘it is pointless to go on demanding
information.69”. The UK Government even went as far as blocking a
parliamentary debate on East Timor, called for by 105 MP’s, fearing that
“widespread publicity… [might] have an unfortunate effect on our
overall relationship with the Indonesians”.70 Despite knowledge of the
“rampage of looting and killing” by Indonesian forces in Dili, the
official UK government line was to be a lie: “If asked to comment on any
stories of atrocities I suggest we say that we have no information.” 71
However, unlike West Papua, the UN were not prepared to ratify
Indonesia’s sovereignty and refused to monitor or recognise any vote
Indonesia may conduct. On December 12th, the General Assembly called for
the recognition of Resolution 1514 (XV) and the withdrawal of
Indonesian troops from East Timor72. Two Security Council resolutions
were also passed but to no effect73. On December 1st 1976, almost one
year later and having seen no improvement, the General Assembly again
passed a Resolution calling for an end to the ‘critical situation in
East Timor’ and refusing to accept Indonesia’s claims of sovereignty74.
Despite Indonesia’s refusal to withdraw and their eventual occupation of
East Timor, this was the last time a resolution was passed by the UN
regarding East Timor until intervention was required over 30 years later
to halt what is now widely accepted as genocide. In the first 12 months
alone, church sources estimated that in excess of 100’000 (or 1 in 7)
East Timorese were killed.75 The role of the UN was even purposefully
undermined by US diplomatic efforts, as Ambassador Moynihan admitted in
the book A Dangerous Place:
… the United States wished things to turn out as they did, and worked
to bring this about. The Department of State desired that the United
Nations prove utterly ineffective in whatever measures it undertook.
This task was given to me, and I carried it forward with no
inconsiderable success76
Arms Sales securing Indonesia’s military superiority over East Timor and West Papua
Throughout the 1970′s, America was supplying some 90% of all of
Indonesia’s arms77. On the eve of the invasion of East Timor, Kissinger
said to Suharto that that the use of US arms could ‘create problems’
before adding, “It depends on how we construe it (my italics); whether
it is in self defence or a foreign operation”78. Following questions
raised by the US senate on the issue, Kissinger met with Deputy
Secretary of State Robert Ingersoll, legal advisor Monroe Leigh and
others to discuss the issue of US arms being used in the invasion.
Kissinger is angry that his deputies had sent him a cable shortly before
he was due to return. His aides wished to clarify his position on the
continuation of arms sales to General Suharto, leading Kissinger to
assess how many people may have seen it and declaring that, “Everything
on paper will be used against me79.” Here is an excerpt from that
meeting:
Kissinger: No one has complained that it was aggression.
Leigh: The Indonesians were violating an agreement with us.
Kissinger: The Israelis’, when they go into Lebanon – when was the last time we protested that?
Leigh: That’s a different situation.
(Under-secretary) Maw: It is self-defence.
Kissinger: And we can’t construe a Communist government in the middle of Indonesia as self-defence?
Leigh: Well… 80
Leigh: The Indonesians were violating an agreement with us.
Kissinger: The Israelis’, when they go into Lebanon – when was the last time we protested that?
Leigh: That’s a different situation.
(Under-secretary) Maw: It is self-defence.
Kissinger: And we can’t construe a Communist government in the middle of Indonesia as self-defence?
Leigh: Well… 80
Later on in the meeting, Kissinger states that, “On the Timor thing,
that will leak in three months and it will come out that Kissinger
overruled his pristine bureaucrats and violated the law…” Despite
congress raising questions regarding the legality of selling arms to
Indonesia at that time, Kissinger had given orders that he wanted to “to
stop the shipments quietly”, but that they were secretly to “start
again” the following month. In fact, as the genocide unfolded, U.S. Arms
shipments doubled81. As Noam Chomsky later testified to the UN, “the
flow of arms was uninterrupted, including attack helicopters and other
equipment required to wipe hundreds of villages off the face of the
earth, destroy crops, and herd the remnants of the population into
internment centres”82
The UK also tried to make use of the situation. The briefing paper
for Sir Michael Palliser’s visit to Indonesia in October 1975 includes
one objective being “to benefit from such defence sales as might be in
our interest”. In April 1978, after the slaughter in East Timor should
have been apparent, British Aerospace announced its first sale of Bae
Hawk ‘trainer’ warplanes to Indonesia; these planes, ‘which are suitable
for ground attack’, were delivered in 198383.
Summary of International Communities response and contraventions of International Law
This widespread knowledge of Indonesia’s actions in East Timor and
the condemnation by the UN did nothing to stop the flow of arms from the
UK and US and neither did it encourage a re-visitation of the AFC or
even a fact-finding mission to West Papua. The main difference is that,
despite glaring similarities between West Papua and East Timor, one is
considered legal and the other has always, in name at least, been
considered illegal, respectively. From supporting acts of aggression
with arms and logistical support to providing diplomatic and legal
legitimacy for Indonesia’s takeover of West Papua, the historical
narrative patently shows at best an attitude of reluctant pragmatism
with regard to the Melanesian people’s right to universal human rights,
such as self-determination and freedom from subjugation. At its worst,
the evidence points to an understanding that there will be little in the
way of objection from the International Community, that repression and
brutalities were likely and were to be supported and that this was
deemed a price worth paying for the economic, ideological and
geo-political benefits reaped by states far removed from the area in
question. Clearly the International Community chose pragmatic policy
over principles, as this excerpt from the Honourable Mr. Faleomavaega
highlights:
Mr Speaker, in other words, it was our national policy to sacrifice
the lives and future of some 800’000 West Papuan New Guineans to the
Indonesian military in exchange, supposedly, for Sukarno and later
Suharto to become our friends, who would organise the most repressive
military regimes in the history of Indonesia.84
So far I have detailed how, despite an extensive framework of
International Law and Judicial system provided by the UN, the
International Community contrived to support Indonesia at the expense of
the Melanesian people. It has been shown that the US, UK and Australian
governments both knew and accepted that the AFC was rigged despite
knowing that the West Papuans almost unanimously desiring independence,
emphatically contravening UN resolution 1514 and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. Despite knowledge of and support for the
Indonesian communist purge in 1965, the West armed Suharto and left West
Papua, and later East Timor, to the extensive brutalities which were
known to be a distinct possibility. As a recognised province of
Indonesia, the situation in West Papua is but a domestic issue in the
eyes of International Law (at least until there is a re-visitation of
the Act of Free Choice). However, West Papuans clearly did not have a
chance to express their desire for independence to the satisfaction of
UN Resolution 1514 (XV). It certainly is not an election through which
you could morally legitimise Indonesian Sovereignty.
In the concluding chapter I wish to highlight the reasons as to why
this failure to enforce International Law was allowed to happen. The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights was a direct response to the
realisation of what state-sponsored repression could achieve. It has
failed in its objectives for 40 years in West Papua and it is vital that
the reasons given by the International Community are fully disclosed
and understood. To say that a Government broke International Law is not
enough; one must give a fair hearing in these matters and so I will now
outline the US, UK and Australian motivations behind ignoring Resolution
1514 (XV), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the UN
Charter.
Pragmatism over Principles: Economic Benefits in Supporting Oppression
The almost universal ‘understanding’ shown by the International
Community towards Indonesia’s actions needs explaining if we are to
retain any faith in these Governments willingness to fulfil their
obligations as member states of the UN. Is Faleomavaega right in saying
that the US ‘sacrificed’ all those lives just so that, ‘Suharto would be
our friend?85’. Certainly the International Community did not go along
with Indonesia’s invasion of West Papua so as to become enemies, but
such an explanation is over-simplistic. It is the value of what this
friendship entails which motivates the breaking of International Law;
that, and the lack of consequences incurred when those who are denied
their Human Rights are both primitive, poor and on the other-side of the
world. Although ideological reasons were raised at the time of the Act
of Free Choice with regard to the spread of Communism, the same argument
could not be applied today. Whatever has caused the International
Community to disregard Human Rights is still relevant today; how else
can we explain the current antipathy from the UK government?
For many centuries now, representative democracies have attempted to
maximise the wealth and security of their own population, fulfilling
their duties according to the social contract theory. There was a time
when this took the form of colonialism, where the human rights of the
colonised country came a distant second to ensuring large wealth for the
coloniser. The signing of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
Resolution 1514 (XV) were designed to put an end to such exploitation
yet the practice continues in all but name. The concept of ensuring
benefits for ones own population at the expense of other nations is now
called pragmatism, as this secret cable sent by Ambassador Woolcott to
the Australian government sent in August 1975 shows:
I wonder whether the Department has ascertained the interest of the
Minister of the Department of Minerals and Energy in the Timor
Situation… The present gap in the agreed sea border… could be much more
readily negotiated with Indonesia… than with Portugal or an independent
Portuguese Timor. I know I am recommending a pragmatic rather than a
principled stand but that is what national interest and foreign policy
is all about (my italics)86
What did the International community hope to gain which could begin
to justify the ongoing support for Indonesia, the crime of military
support for an act of aggression in East Timor and the rigging of an
election and (therefore) occupation in West Papua contravening
Resolution 1514 (XV)?
Energy and resources are a powerful influence in the zeitgeist of
world trade and capitalization. Shortly before Australia sent in troops
to East Timor, Australia signed an agreement with Indonesia resulting in
the two nations sharing the gas fields off the coast of Timor, to be
piped to refineries built on Australia’s northern coast. East Timor’s
greatest natural resource and its best chance at fulfilling a stable and
viable independent state were signed away. Yet perhaps this is actually
a blessing? With nothing left to gain from occupation, Indonesia no
longer had anything to lose in relinquishing control. Ironically, West
Papua is not so fortunate. The country has incredible natural resources
of Gas, Gold and Copper, with large investment by Western companies such
as BP and RioTinto.
Henry Kissinger, having clandestinely supported Indonesia’s expansionist policy, is now a board member of RioTinto who operate the world’s largest copper and gold mine called Grasberg in West Papua. When asked whether he could use the lobbying power of RioTinto to persuade Indonesia to change its policy and support self-determination for the people of East Timor, he said, “As a private American corporation engaged in private business in an area far removed from Timor, but in Indonesia (West Papua), I do not believe it is their job to get itself involved in that issue.”87. The response is significant in two ways. Firstly, as a matter of ‘private business’, it assumes that economic activity by a private business is not bound by matters of ethics or principle when it comes to making money. Secondly, it shows that even someone who was deeply involved in Indonesia’s expansionist aims and with insider knowledge of the rigged elections can dismiss West Papua as part of Indonesia, thereby legitimising actions agreed with the GOI at the expense of West Papuans Human Rights.
Kissinger’s claim that it is not RioTinto’ job to get involved in the
East Timor issue may have some validity. After all, it is indeed far
removed from the area in question and RioTinto are not themselves
involved beyond paying tax to Indonesia. What Kissinger must be aware of
however is the similarities between East Timor and West Papua, where
the Grasberg mine is located. The history of the Grasberg mine is one of
confrontation between RioTinto and the indigenous people. RioTinto
bought vast swaths of indigenous peoples land from Indonesia before the
implementation of the AFC, signing a 30 year deal with Indonesia in
196788. Since then, the mine has had such a devastating environmental
impact through the dumping of 40m tonnes of waste rock into the river
system every year that in 1995, the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation revoked Freeport’s insurance policy for environmental
violations of a sort that would not be allowed in the US89. Alongside
the repression from the military authorities, the RioTinto Grasberg Mine
is a fundamental bone of contention for West Papuans who see little
improvement in living standards and a lot of environmental damage to the
mountain and river systems below. The security for the mine is provided
by the Indonesian military, which stand accused of faking attacks on
the mine in order to increase the amount of money being paid for
protection straight into army officer’s bank accounts90. In this
instance it is hard to make sense of Kissinger’s words. Having been
responsible for much of the US policy with regard to Indonesia in his
role as US Secretary of State and now profiting from Indonesian
occupation of West Papua, perhaps it is not a stretch to suggest it is
his job to get involved in that issue?
Britain and Australia also benefit greatly from Indonesia’s
expansionism. British Petroleum has signed a deal to extract Gas from
the extensive fields located in Beru-Bintuni Bay, West Papua, due to
start production in 200891. Although they have vowed not to use the
Indonesian military as security, there are concerns that the social and
environmental cost could lead to another situation like that at the
Grasberg mine. Australia, as already mentioned, has signed agreements
with Indonesia, sharing the Gas fields located off the coast of East
Timor.
The nature and extent of the wealth generated by natural resources
cannot be understated: they are finite materials which will never drop
in value and which by their nature are fixed and immobile. They provide
massive amounts of wealth, most of which goes to the companies
themselves and the GOI. Unfortunately this means that in giving West
Papua its Independence, UK, U.S and Australian governments would be
sacrificing the business opportunities for large domestic companies (It
is highly unlikely that RioTinto would be allowed to continue at the
Grasberg mine were Indonesia to relinquish sovereignty).
The story of West Papua’s forced capitulation to the military regime
of Indonesia is little known outside of South-East Asia. Despite the US,
UK and Australian governments supporting the invasion, the rigged
elections and the brutal repression of the Melanesian people, the
general public of these ‘civilised’ states have scant knowledge of their
own governments’ actions. No-one has yet been brought to account and
the AFC still stands as a legal and binding declaration of West Papuans
wish to integrate with their oppressors. The UN was made obsolete by the
very countries that helped create it for no purpose other than
pragmatic economic and geo-political gains. That there has never been
genocide without pragmatic economic and political aims does not seem to
have occurred to those involved. It is enough it seems to know that our
pragmatic aims are justified, whatever the historical facts may say.
Indonesia may be the ones that are directly responsible, but the
International community was, and continues to be, fundamental to its
continuation. Until the UN ratify this situation and re-visit the AFC
fairly the plight of the West Papuans will remain a matter for Indonesia
alone to deal with, as they see fit.
